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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the years 1946-1967 the Bell System made large 
dollar profits by meeting the increasing demands of communica­
tion customers. In order to meet these demands, large volumes 
of capital investments were necessary. A comprehensive study 
is needed to examine the reasons for this increased demand 
and to evaluate the sources of financing that were used. As 
a result of this stUdy the best investment alternatives can 
also be evaluated for future financing in the Bell System. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
statement 2f. ~ problem. It is the purpose of this 
thesis (1) to examine the reasons for the inorease in demand 
for telephone services since 1945; (2) to measure the capital 
dollars used to meet this demand; (3) to analyze and evaluate 
the sources of financing used and available; and (4) to 
examine future financing needs. 
Importance of ~ study. Because the Bell System's 
total operating revenue is a little over 1.5 per cent of the 
entire nation's Gl\rp1 and its oorporate equity financing 
l Bel1 system Financin£, American Telephone and Tele­
graph CoiiiP'ffi1y, Treasury Department, July, 1967, p. 3. 
2 
accounted for about 38 per cent1 of the total equity financing 
of all corporations, from 1946-1967, the importance of the 
Bell System in the entire economy can be easily seen. 
II. DEFINITIONS OF TEm1S USED 
The ~ System. The Bell System represents a wide 
range of activities, which include the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, Western Electric Company, Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, and the many subsidiary and other associated 
telephone companies. 
American Telephone ~ Telegraph Company. This part of 
the Bell System provides service to the various subsidiary 
companies. These services include financial help, counseling, 
and technical assistance. AT&T is also responsible for 
operating the long distance lines that interconnect or run 
through the subsidiary companies. 
Western Electric Company. This branch of the Bell 
System is responsible for manufacturiv~. purchasing, distri­
buting, and installing certain equipment for the associated 
companies. 
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~ Telephone Laboratories. The laboratories are 
responsible for research and development work for the Bell 
System and the western Electric Company. 
The subsidiary and other associated telephone companies. 
Their responsibilities include prOViding communication ser­
vices and facilities within their respective territories with 
the aid of services received from the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company under license contract. 
Demand. When the term demand is used in this study, it 
refers to serVices requested and received by telephone cus­
tomers. These serVices include the actual hardware as well as 
the ability to communicate from one point to another. 
Local service. This refers to the recurring charges 
for using instruments such as telephones, teletypewriters, or 
other terminal devices and the use of the switching equipment 
to communicate on a local basis without the charge for long 
distance services. 
Toll. Toll refers to the charges for communicating to 
other points outside of the local calling area. 
Plant investment. This is the money measured in terms 
of original cost invested in telephones, switching eqUipment, 
and lines or cables connecting any communicating devices. 
4
 
Average telephone plant. Since the amount of plant 
investment changes monthly, when annual financial figures are 
used an average telephone plant figure must be obtained. 
This figure is obtained by averaging the amount of plant 
investment at the first of the year with the plant investment 
at the end of the year. 
Total income. This is total operating revenue less 
operating expenses and taxes. Interest charges are deducted' 
from this figure to obtain net income. 
III. ORGANIZATION 
The body of the thesis will first examine the quantity 
of telephone services sold since 1946 and compare related 
statistics in the general economy with the Bell System sta­
tistics. Next, the money used to finance the quantity of 
telephone services sold will be examined by source. These 
sources of financing will then be evaluated according to the 
availability, effect on earnings, and effect on future 
financing needs. Finally, a look at future financing needs 
will be undertaken. 
CHAPTER II. 
POST WORLD WAR II DE~lAND FOR TELEPHONE SERVICES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature 
and determinants of the demand for telephone services since 
World War II. As will be seen, this period of time was one 
of great expansion for the Bell System. There were many 
reasons for this expansion both within the Bell System and in 
the economy in general. Since many of the reasons accounting 
for the growth in telephone services sold are the same as, or 
associated with, reasons for the increase in sales of products 
and services sold in the general economy, various statistical 
data will be presented comparing the Bell System with the 
general economy since 1946. 
I. THE TREND OF THE GENERAL ECONOi-rr 
In the period, 1946 to 1967, the GNP increased by 285 
per cent. 1 There are several reasons for this increase. 
Population increase can be an important factor in 
determining the level of GNP. The population of the United 
states increased from 141.9 million people in 1967. 2 This is 
lUnited States Bureau of the Census, Statistioal 
Abstract of the United states: 5968 (Hashington. D. C.:· 
Government Printing Office, 1969 , p. 313. 
2Ibid., p. 5. 
6 
about a 40 per cent increase. To understand the effects that 
population can have on GNP, an analysis needs to be made of 
these population figures. 
First, this population growth has been coincident with 
an increase in output per capita. Since 1839 total output per 
1capita per decade has increased 17.2 per cent. Table I shows 
that in constant (1958) dollars Disposable Personal Income per 
capita rose about 83 per cent per capita from 1946 to 1967 and 
in constant (1958) dollars total GNP per capita rose 98 per 
cent during this period. This means that the population has 
not merely grown in numbers, but has at the same time received 
more total goods and services. From these figures it can be 
seen that the period from 1946 to 1967 was a period of growth 
in per capita consumption. It is interesting to note that the 
amount consumed, as compared to disposable personal income, 
remained at about 92 per cent throughout this period. The 
population growth in the post World War II period was one of 
the factors which contributed to the increase in GNP. These 
additional people needed food, clothing, housing, and services 
from the economy and the rising income gave them the means to 
buy these items. 
Another reason for the increase in GNP in the post 
World War II period has been the large number of technological 
1Ib~d., p. 315. 
TABLE I 
Pl'~R CAPITA INCONE AND PRODUCT IN CUH.BENT AND CONSTANT (1958)
 
DOLLARS 1946-1967 (SELECTED YEABS)
 
Item 1946 1950 1955 1958 1960 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 %Incr. 
Current Dollars 
G~ 
Disposable Personal 
Income 
Personal Consumption 
Expenditures 
1.490 
1.120 
1.090 
1,877 
1.364 
1.259 
2.408 
1,666 
1.539 
2.569 
1.831 
1.666 
2.788 
1.937 
1.800 
3.117 
2.136 
1.980 
3.288 
2.272 
2.089 
3.501 
2.411 
2.218 
3.775 
2.567 
2.362 
3.942 
2.736 
2.469 
165 
144 
117 
Constant (1958) Dollars 
GNP 
Disposable Personal 
Income 
Personal Consumption 
Expendi tures 
1.698 
1.310 
1.280 
2.342 
1.646 
1.659 
2.650 
1.795 
1.659 
2.569 
1.831 
1.666 
2.699 
1.883 
1.749 
2.909 
2.01) 
1.865 
3.019 
2,116 
1.946 
3.158 
2.214 
2.036 
3.291 
2.294 
2.111 
3.361 
2.393 
2.160 
98 
83 
69 
Source: Statistical Abstract of ~ United states. 1968. p. 315. 
~ 
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changes that have taken place. These technological changes 
have made production more economical, have introduced new 
products and services, and have altered the capital formation 
of the economy. Many of these technological innovations were 
a result of the wartime production. Faster methods of manu­
facturing planes, ships, rockets, and weapons were developed 
out of necessity. New products were developed as by-products 
of research in radar, communication, nuclear, and naval develop-
mente It was found that sheer manpower could no longer compete 
against the forces of applied science and technology. 
The measurement of technological progress 1s not as 
easy as it may seem at the outset. Some technological advances 
result in new products while others merely change product 
performance. Therefore, the question of how to measure a 
technological change becomes very difficult. One indicator 
of technological change is to examine research and development 
expenditures. By 1960 Research and Development, as a per­
centage of GNP, was about five times what it was in 1940 and 
double what it was in 1953. 1 If Research and Development can 
be used as a measure of technological advance, then the post 
World War II period was a time of advancement in this area. 
1R1chard R. Nelson, Technology, Economic Growth and
 
Public Bollc1 (Washington, D. C.: The Rand Corporation~967),
 
p. 92. 
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Actions of the government also had an impact on the 
economy. A "backlog" of consumer demand was created by war­
time regulation during the period 1941 to 1945. Rationing of 
some goods, non-production of others, price controls, and wage 
controls were examples of some of the wartime regulation that 
took place. As a reSUlt, there was a great deal of pent up 
purchasing power. Holdings of United states savings bonds 
increased from $10.2 billion in June, 1942, to $45.6 billion 
in June, 1945; consumer credit outstanding declined from $9.8 
billion in 1941 to $616 million in 1945; and total bank deposits 
of $81.8 billion on December 31, 1941. mounted to $165.6 billion 
by December 31, 1945. 1 These figures help show that liqUidity 
was higher at the end of the war than at the beginning of this 
period. This liqUidity and the continuation of the wartime 
policy of stabiliZing interest rates at low levels were fac­
tors which created investment opportunities in the late 
1940's. Consumers wanted goods and were eager to spend idle 
funds to get them. 
Government spending also has had a large impact on the 
economy. Government spending on goods and services as a per­
centage of G~~ has increased from an annual average of 4 per 
cent in the 1930-40 period to an annual average of over 15 per 
1JOhn R. Craf, Economic Development of the United 
states (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952):-P. 1~3. 
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cent in 1946 to 1967 period. Using constant (1958) dollars, 
government spending as a percentage of GNP has increased from 
14 per cent to 19 per cent from 1946 to 1967. 1 (See Table 
II.) As a result, government expenditures did provide power­
ful tools for economic stabilization and at the same time 
helped contribute to the growth in demand. 
Investment spending in the post World War II economy 
has also been important. Theoretically, a business will 
undertake an investment when the expected rate of return over 
the productive life of the asset at least equals the cost of 
the funds to be invested. Very practically, this assumes the 
business can measure the return on the additional investment. 
At any rate, before a business will spend the investment 
dollars, an investment opportunity must exist, the expected 
return after discount for uncertainty must be considered, and 
investment funds must be available. 
Investment opportunities are created by replacement 
requirements, the reqUirements for additional plant to meet 
increased sales, and those investments needed to update a 
plant in order to provide new or different products or services. 
In the post World War II period interest rates were 
stabilized at low levels. This made many investments more 
profitable than would have been the case had the interest 
lstatistical Abstract of the United states, 1968, p. 314. 
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rates been higher. Also there were more savings dollars 
available because of the low level of consumption expenditures 
during the war years. The combination of these factors made 
the post war period a prime time for investment. Other fac­
tors that helped contribute to this increase in investment 
include lack of replacements during the war years and the 
technological changes that had taken place. 
Up to this point some of the factors which helped con­
tribute to an increase in GNP in the post World War II period 
have been examined. It would now be appropriate to examine the 
magnitude of the increase in GNP and other related figures. 
Examination of the figures in Table III indicates that 
the years 1946 to 1967 were years of increasing national 
income figures and that this increase had a large impact on 
the economy: Personal consumption expenditures increased 94 
per cent, government spending on goods and services increased 
261 per cent, and gross private domestic investment increased 
163 per cent, all measured in constant 1958 dollars. These 
increases also had an impact on the Bell System, an impact 
which will be examined in detail later in the study. 
The final area to be examined in the post World War II 
economic environment is inflation. Again this information 
will be used in discussing the Bell System·s financing during 
this same period of time. 
TABLE II 
F.iillEBAL EXPENDITUElES AS SHOIffl IN THE NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS 1946-1966 
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) (SELECTED YEARS) 
Item 1946 1950 1955 1958 1960 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 % Incr. 
current Dollars 
Gross National Product 
Gov't Purchases o~ Goods 
and Services 
Gov't Transfers and 
SUbsidies 
203.7 
30.7 
11.3 
284.8 
37.9 
22.9 
398.0 
74.2 
23.4 
447.3 
94.2 
36.5 
503.8 
99.6 
42.8 
590.5 
122.5 
44.4 
631.7 
128.9 
66.7 
681.2 
136.2 
49.6 
739.6 
153.0 
55.7 
785.0 
176.3 
61.2 
285 
474 
442 
Constant (~) Q2llars 
Gross National Product 
Gov't Purchases of Goods 
and services 
256.1 
38.4 
355.3 
52.8 
438.0 
85.2 
447.3 
94.2 
487.8 
94.9 
551.0 
109.6 
580.0 
111.3 
614.4 
114.1 
647.8 
123.2 
669.3 
138.7 
161 
261 
Source: statistical Abstract Q! ~ Un1ted States, 1968, p. 314. 
~ 
N 
TABLE III 
SELECTED NATIONAL INCO~lli AND EXPENDITURE FIGURES 1946-1967 
(CONSTANT 1958 DOLLARS) (IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
Item 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1967 Per cent Change 
GNP 
National Income 
256.1 
272.8 
355.3 
277.8 
438.0 
355.1 
487.8 
411.6 
614.4 
551.5 
669.3 
611.6 
161 
124 
Personal Consumption 
Expenditures 222.2 230.5 274.2 316.2 397.7 430.5 94 
Disposable 
Income 
Personal 
240. L~ 249.6 296.7 340.2 435.0 487.5 103 
Personal Savings 21.0 15.0 16.9 16.9 27.7 37.9 80 
Gov't Spending 
(Goods & Services) 
Gross Private Domestic 
38.4 52.8 85.2 94.9 114.1 138.7 261 
Investment 43.4 54.1 67.4 74.8 108.1 114.3 163 
Source: Statistical Abstract of ~ United States, 1968, p. 314. 
!"-lo 
"-'> 
14 
TABLE IV 
CONSUHER PRICE INDEK--sELECTED YEARS 
1957-1959 :;: 100 
1946 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1967 
66.1 
86.8 
93.2 
100.7 
102.5 
106.1 
Source: statistical Abstract of ~ United states. 
1968. p. 341. 
The Consumer Price Index has increased about 1.5 points per 
year since 1900. 1 However. as seen in Table IV. it has 
averaged about 1.9 points per year since 1946. 
Before an examination is made of the Bell System sta­
tistics during this same period. it might be well to summarize 
what has been covered thus far. First. population did increase 
during this period. This. along with technological changes. 
various affects as a result of government regulation and 
spending. and a generous increase in investment caused an over­
all increase in GNP and related figures in the post World War 
II period. Although there was a slightly higher than normal 
lstatistlcal Abstract 2£ ~ United states, 1968. p. J41. 
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amount of inflation during this period it was not a period of 
hyperinflation. 
II. THE TREND OF THE BELL SYSTEM 
The Bell System's primary reason for eXisting is to 
provide communication services and at the same time make a 
reasonable profit for its stockholders. The period after 
World War II was a time of great expansion for the Bell System. 
During this period the Bell System spent a great deal of money 
to meet the needs of communication customers and at the same 
time was provided the opportunity to make a profit for its' 
stockholders. There were a number of reasons why this period 
was one of expansion for the Bell System. Each of these 
reasons will be discussed in turn. 
The Bell System has obtained from various sources about 
$49 billion since 1946 to meet a need for about 60 million 
more telephones and 70 billion more telephone conversations. 1 
This increase in telephones and conversations was partly a 
result of the increase in the sale of products and services in 
the general economy discussed above. As more goods and services 
were consumed, the Bell System services were included. 
l Eell System Statistical Manual, American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, Corporate Results Analysis Divislon, Aprll, 
1968. 
16 
Just as increased population had a large impact on the 
general economy, this same increased population generated a 
larger need for telephone services. In 1946. it is estimated 
there were 38,830,000 households in the United states 
(excluding Hawaii and Alaska). 1 In 1967, the households 
numbered 59.632,000. 2 In 1946, the Bell and non-Bell System 
companies had telephones in 51.4 per cent of these households. 3 
If the percentage had remained the same through 1967, the 
increased households would have demanded 10,028,000 more tele­
phones. As it actually happened, the percentage of households 
with telephone service increased from 51.4 per cent in 1946 to 
88.2 per cent in 1967. Therefore, the increase of about 60 
million telephones was a result of two factors. First, the 
increase in population accounted for about 10 million of the 
60 million increase, assuming the percentage of households 
with telephone service had remained the same. secondly, the 
percentage of the households that wanted telephones increased 
and accounted for the remaining 50 million increase. 
This increased population also helped increase the 
number of long distance interstate calls in 1967 to five times 
what it was in 1946. 4 The average telephone conversations 
1Ibid., p. 504. 
3Ib1d • 
4~ell Slstem statistical Il1anual. April. 1968. p. 803. 
(including local and toll) 
year in 1946 to 666.5 in 1967. 1 This tremendous increase in 
telephones and telephone conversations helps substantiate the 
fact that the population wanted and received more telephone 
services. The telephone soon became not a luxury, but a 
necessary part of the household. 
As was pointed out previously, there was a backlog of 
consumer spending created by World War II. Part of the reason 
for this was that most material and manpower were devoted to 
producing material needed for the war. Therefore, many other 
goods were not manufactured. This had its effect on the 
telephone industry. It was difficult to obtain material needed 
for telephone cables, central office eqUipment, and other items 
necessary for communication. There was also a shortage of 
manpower to handle the installation of telephones and related 
equipment. As a result, immediately after the war, the 
requests for telephone serVice that could not be filled because 
of lack of facilities, money, and manpower during World War II 
rose from 93,000 as of December 31, 1942, to 1.986,000 as of 
December 31, 1945. 2 There was also a backlog of eXisting 
customers who wanted better grades of services (such as a 
person on a multiple-party I1ne wanting a private line). The 
l Ibid .• p. 802. 
2 Ibiq., p. 518. 
17 
per capita increased from 30) per 
18 
request for better grades of service hit a peak of 2.090,000 
in 1949. 1 In 1946, there were only approximately 4 million 
one-party lines as compared to 32 million in 1967. 2 In 1946. 
there were about 7 million two-party lines as compared to 6.6 
million in 1967. 3 
Technological changes also helped induce a certain 
amount of consumer requests for telephone serVices because of 
the increased quality of the product. In the residence market 
the increased quality of telephone transmission made both 
local and long distance service more desirable. This improved 
quality has been a result of improvements in central office 
equipment. underground and aerial cables, instruments (tele­
phones and teletypewriters) and better analysis of trouble 
reports. In both the business and residence markets, the 
ease of making local and long distance calls by self-dialing 
helped increase the volume of calls made. In 1964. 59.2 per 
cent of the United States telephones were dial. This same 
figure in 1967 was 99.8 per cent. 4 
In the post World War II period, a wider range of ser­
vices became available for the customer who needed communica­
tion services for his business. One example of these wider 
range of services was the teletypewriter, which was used 
l Ibid • 2 Ibid • • p • 510. 
J Ib1d • 4Ib1d • , p. 505. 
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primarily by the business customer. Another example of the 
wider range of services offered was video transmission. In 
1946, this service generated no revenue and in 1967 the 
revenue from this service amounted to $53.8 ml11ion. 1 
Just as the governments have had an impact on the general 
economy, the Bell System has felt a part of this impact. As 
a customer, the governments' spending on space programs, 
normal telephone usage and wider ranges of services has 
increased. 
Government has also had a large impact on the general 
economy through regulation and on the Bell System by regula­
tion through the Federal Communications Commission. This 
organization was created: 
for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign 
commerce in communication by the wire or radio so as 
to make available, so far as possible to all people 
of the United states, a rapid, efficient, nationwide, 
and 't'1Orld tilde ~7ire and radio communi cat ion servi ce 
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for 
the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose 
of promotion safety of life and property through the 
use of wire and radio communications, and for the 
purpose of securing a more effective execution of 
this policy by centralizing authority heretofore 
granted by law to several agencies and by granting 
additional authority with respect to interstate a9d 
foreign commerce in wire and radio commuhication. 
1Ibid., p. 206 • 
2Unlted states Government Organizational Manual 1967-68 
(Washington; D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 12~. 
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Regulation will be discussed in more detail later. 
However, one or two general comments are in order at this time. 
In a sense, the Commission attempts to serve the same role as 
competition does in many other industries. The Federal Com­
munications Commission has conducted many hearings on pricing 
and overall operations of the Bell System. From 1956 to 1966 
there was a ten-year investigation to decide how much the 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company should charge for 
private line teletype services. Another hearing started in 
1966 on how much the Bell System should earn. At that time 
Ben S. Gilmer, Executive Vice-President, testified that the 
Bell System ought to earn about 8 per cent on capital.-1. The 
Federal Communications Commission did not agree. As a result 
there have been many price cuts ordered by the Commission. 
The impact of the Government through the Commission will be 
discussed in more detail in a later chapter. 
Some of the other reasons why the post World War II 
period was a time of great expansion for the Bell System 
centers around some changes that were made internally. 
One change occurred in the merchandising philosophy of 
the Bell System. In 1946, the Bell System felt it was not 
necessary to aggressively merchandise its products. The 
1.t4here AT&T Inquiry is Really Heading," U. s. News and
-World Report, LX (February 21, 1966), 120. 
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System felt the general public knew what they wanted in tele­
phone service. In about 1953. the Bell System began to 
realize they were losing out on a potentially large market. 
The Bell System began to merchandise their services 
aggressively through advertising. In 1950 they spent $17 
million on advertising and this same figure was $38 million 
in 1956 and $56 million in 1967. 1 They also began to merchan­
dise through contacts that the employees would have with 
customers when taking orders for services or at the time of 
installation. Through advertising and customer contacts the 
advantages of having additional telephones in the households 
were pointed out and the Bell System began to receive a 
greater share of the consumers' dollars. As a result of these 
merchandising techniques. more of Bell services t'1ere sold. 
As an example, the number of residence extensions increased 
from 1.1 million in 1946 to 18.8 million in 1967. 2 This kind 
of an increase could not have been a result of population 
increases alone. as can be seen by comparing the extension per 
capita figures in these two years. In 1946 the number of 
extensions per capita was .017 and in 1967 this same figure 
INumber i Report, American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company. Bell System Statistical Division, September. 1969, 
p. 27. 
212lli System Stati st lcal I'1e.nual, April, 1968, p. 516. 
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was .094. 1 Of course, this kind of increase in services 
meant more revenue for the Bell System. 
Not only did they decide to merchandise additional 
locations, but they began developing and merchandising differ­
ent styles of sets. Just as car manufacturers began making 
deluxe style cars, the Bell System began manufacturing deluxe 
style telephones. °J.lhe "color phone" was introduced in 1955, 
the Princess style in 1960, and the Trimline in 1965, and 
TOUCH-TO~~ service is presently being introduced throughout 
the Bell System. Another new telephone called the Picturephone, 
which allows one to view someone or something as he is having 
a conversation, is currently on trial and someday may be as 
common as the Princess and the Trimline are today. 
In addition to these changes in telephones, other ser­
vices are constantly being developed, and tested for the resi­
dence and business markets. Automatic call transfers, a 
method of transferring any calls received to another pre­
selected number if a customer was not going to be home, and 
suppressed digit dialing, where calls could be placed by 
dialing two or three digits instead of the usual seven digits, 
are examples of the new kind of services being introduced. 
The Bell System's management found that by merchan­
dising, they are giving the consumer the option of spending 
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more of the consumer dollar with the Bell System. The Bell 
System's management also feel they are providing the custo~er 
with better service by giving him a wider choice of products. 
Another service that has become a part of the American 
life and has provided a real service is yellow page advertising. 
Revenue from this service has grown from $63.7 million in 
1946 to $533.5 million in 1967. 1 
One other reason why the post World War II period was 
a time of great expansion for the Bell System centers around 
pricing. As was pointed out earlier, the consumer price 
index almost doubled from 1946 to 1967. This has not been 
true of the prices of most Bell system services. 
Table V shows that while the Consumer Price Index has 
increased 40 per cent, the cost of a private resident telephone 
in a representative city (Des Moines, Iowa) has increased 78 
per cent. It also shows that long distance interstate rate 
decreases have ranged from 8 per cent to 57 per cent since 
1946. This table has not shown intrastate long distance 
rates and their related changes because to show an accurate 
picture would require an analysis of each state's rate tables. 
It would be accurate, however, to state that most intrastate 
1Ibid., p. 202. 
TABLE V
 
BELL SYSTEM PRICE CHANGES 1946 TO 1967--SELECTED EXAMPLES
 
1946 1955 1965 1967 Per Cent Change 
Consumer Pri ce Index 
(Base 1957-1959 = 100) 66.1 93.2 102.5 106.1 40 
Private Line Bate 
Des Moines, Iowa 3.75 5.50 6.25 6.25 78 
Long Distance Interstate Calls 
(Station-Station 3-Mln Day Bate)
New York to san Franoisoo 2.50 2.50 2.25 1.70 -32 
Des Mo1nes to San Frano1sco 2.35 2.05 1.80 1.55 -34 
Des Mo1nes to New York 2.05 1.80 1.55 1.40 -32 
Des Mo1nes 
Des Mo1nes 
to Ch1cago 
to M1am1 
1.00 
2.25 
1.00 
1.90 
1.00 
1.70 
1.00 
1.40 
o 
-;8 
(Stat1on-Stat1on 3-Min Night Rate)
New York to San Franoisco 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 -50 
Des Mo1nes to San Frano1soo 1.85 1.65 .90 .85 -54 
Des Mo1nes to New York 1.55 1.45 .75 .75 -52 
Des Moines 
Des Mo1nes 
to 
to 
Ch1cago
Miam1 
.65 
1.75 
.75 
1.50 
.60 
.80 
.60 
.75 
- 8 
-57 
Source: ~ Tariff, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, 1969. 
N 
~ 
rates have followed the pattern established by interstate 
rates and their related Changes. 1 
It may be surprising that the Bell System has been 
able to do this during an inflationary period. The main 
reason has been because of improved technology. Because more 
calls could be handled with improved sWitching equipment, the 
cost of each call could be reduced and the difference be made 
up on a volume basis. Since more and more calls are self-
dial, the variable cost of haVing operators handle these 
calls has been reduced. Therefore, the lessened cost of each 
call could be reduced and passed on to the consumer. It was 
found that there was a demand for this kind of long distance 
services at reduced rates. Without the additional demand and 
its related elasticity long distance service price reduction 
would not have been possible. 
Since the price of long distance messages has decreased 
in relationship to other prices, this has made the long dis­
tance message comparatively attractive to the consumer. Even 
if income and the consumer price index had remained fixed 
since 1946, the lower price of long distance messages relative 
to other goods mal{es this service more attractive. 
l pred w. Henck, Thomas M. Malia, and Rupert Welch. 
Telecormnunications Reports: 1222 (Washington: National Press), 
p. 49. 
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There are several reasons why this discussion is being 
concentrated on long distance service. First, the prices of 
other Bell services offered have actually ihcreased. Second, 
the decreased price has been rather dramatic. Third, the 
relative importance of long distance revenues has changed 
since 1946. In 1946, long distance (toll) revenues accounted 
1for about 41 per cent of total revenue. In 1967, this 
percentage increased to about 44 per cent of total revenues. 
Table VI can be used to help analyze toll revenues and 
pricing. This table will help show if more messages are 
demanded and what the magnitude of this demand might be. 
Table VI is summarized in Table VII by nonrate change years, 
rate increase years, and rate decrease years. From these two 
tables the following conclusions can be dral~. First, the 
average annual per cent increase in toll volumes in nonrate 
change years is 7.96 per cent. Second, this same figure in 
rate increase years 1s 6.81 per cent. Third, this same figure 
in rate decrease years 1s 12.91 per cent. There are some 
assumptions that must be made in order for these figures to be 
used in later analysis. First, that the twenty-two year 
period being examined can be used to predict what would happen 
when further rate reductions were introduced. Secondly, that 
advertising makes the consumers aware of the rate change in the 
lBel1 System Statistical Manual, April, 1968, p. 202. 
_~I_-
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TABLE VI 
INTERSTATE TOLL BEDUCTIONS AND BEFLECTED VOLUl-1E3­

IOWA TO THE WORLD
 
Per Cent 
Increase Dollar 
Toll From Prevo Amount of 
Year Date of Rate Increase or Decrease Volume Year Rate Change 
1946 
1947 
1948 
February 1. 1946 (Decrease) 2.)95.061
2,445,659 
2,811,410 
14.62 
2.11 
14.95 
- $ 66,000 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
March 1.1952 (Increase) 
October 1, 1953 (Increase) 
2,840,0)0 
),072,618 
3,289,312 
3,555,259 
3,716,899 
3,821, 216 
1.01 
8.18 
7.05 
8.08 
4.54 
2.80 
+ 
+ 
175.000 
800,000 
1955 
1956 
4,307.144 
4,686,346 
12.71 
8.80 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
196)
1964 
September 19, 
April 4. 1963 
1959 (Decrease) 
( Decrease 
5.013,857 
5.455.436 
6,309.142 
6.797,989 
7,209.289 
13, 132,699* 
14,466.360 
16,020,693 
6.98 
8.80 
15.65 
7.75 
6.05 
8.77* 
10.16 
10.74 
404,900 
300.000 
1965 
1966 
1967 
February 1, 1965, 
April 1, 1965 (Decrease) 
November 1, 1967 (Decrease) 
18,321, 780 
20,761,632 
22,720.309 
14.37 
13.25 
9.43 
- 1,100,000 
- 1, 100,000 
Source I ~ Tariff, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company. 1969. 
*The large increase from 1961 to 1962 was partially a result of 
the method of tallying interstate calls within the Northwestern Bell 
Company. The percentage change from 1961 to 1962 has deducted the 
effeot of this change. 
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TABLE VII
 
SUIIlMARY OF TABLE VI
 
Nonrate Change Yea.rs Bate Increase Years Bate Decrease Yea.rs 
Per Cent Per cent Per Cent 
Increase From Change From Cha.nge From 
Year Previous Year Year Previous Yr. Year Previous Yr. 
1947 2.11 1952 8.08 1946 14.92 
1948 14.95 1953 4.54 1959 15.65 
1949 1.01 1963 10.16 
1950 8.18 1965 14.37 
1951 7.05 1967 9.43 
1954 2.08 
1955 12.71 
1956 8.80 
1957 6.98 
1958 8.80 
1960 7.75 
1961 6.05 
1962 8.87 
1964 10.74 
1966 
Total ~ tJ.6~ 64.331 9. 
Overage/ 
Year 7.96 6.81 12.91 
source a See Table VI. 
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same year that the change takes place. Third, the change 
from one year to the next was not affected a great deal by 
the cyclical changes in the economy. Fourth, that the rate 
changes were about equal in dollar magnitude. These assump­
tions may seem somewhat restrictive, meaning that they in­
validate the data presented. However, after some discussion 
it can be shown that the restrictions are very minor. 
Fi rst, the twenty-tl'lO year period under di scussion was 
unusual in terms of demand for toll services. However, in 
later analysis it will be shown that the figures used do not 
depend on the magnitude of change from year to year but how 
this change varies from the norm when rates are increased or 
decreased. Therefore, this assumption will not be restric­
tive. 
The second assumption, involving advertising, is some­
what restrictive. \fuen a rate decrease takes place, adver­
tising will make a majority of the consumers aware of the 
change. This advertising will come through television, radio, 
billing inserts, and billboards primarily. Even though a 
majority of the consumers are aware of the change, there will 
still be a certain percentage of the consumers that will not 
take advantage of the lower cost immediately. Therefore, a 
portion of the increase in toll volumes resulting from a 
decrease in toll rates l"1ill not take place until sometime 
after the date on which the rate change takes place. H01-.rever, 
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this same pattern will occur with each change in rates and 
makes this assumption only mildly restrictive, partly because 
the change would not be far removed from the date of the 
change. 
The third assumption appears not to be restrictive. 
In reviewing the years where there were large increases in 
toll volumes, it doesn't appear that there is any pattern of 
these years coinciding with the fluctuations in the general 
economy. A trend of growth in the general economy would affect 
all years about the same. 
The fourth assumption concerning the dollar amounts of 
the toll decreases is also not restrictive. The general 
public has no real knowledge of this dollar amount. The 
knowledge they do have is that toll prices have changed. The 
telephone customers do not appear to be extremely sensitive to 
the magnitude of the change but are sensitive to the fact that 
a change has taken place. 
With the help of Tables VI and VII and the preceding 
discussion, the questions originally raised concerning long 
distance pricing and volumes can now be answered. 
First, it appears over the long run that more messages' 
are demanded when a rate reduction is introduced. This can 
be seen by comparing the peroentage increases in nonrate 
change years with increases in rate decrease years. It 
appears from Table VII that the rate decrease years generate 
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about 5 per cent more toll calls than a nonrate change year. 
The conclusion can be drawn that by making a significant rate 
reduction, more long distance calls will be demanded by con­
sumers. The measure of elasticity will not be determined in 
th1s paper. The above d1scussion s1mply po1nts out that 
pr1ce changes appear to have an affect on quant1ty demanded. 
Other observations can also be made. The volume of 
calls demanded appears to have a ratchet effect. Wh1le a 
rate decrease appears to 1ncrease volumes about 5 per cent 
annually, on the average a rate 1ncrease has the effect of a 
1.15 per cent dec11ne 1n volumes. Th1s conclus1on 1s reached 
by s1mply compar1ng the percentage change 1n nonrate change­
years, rate increase years, and rate decrease years in Table 
VII. In other words, a rate decrease appears to 1ncrease toll 
volumes about 5 percentage po1nts above the normal annual 
increase of 8 per cent or to a total of 13 per cent, wh1le a 
rate 1ncrease appears to decrease toll volumes about 1 per­
oentage poInt below the normal annual 1ncrease of 8 per cent 
or to a total of 7 per cent. 
Up to th1s po1nt some of the factors wh1ch helped con­
tribute to the 1noreased purohase of telephone serv1ces has 
been exam1ned. It would now be appropr1ate to examine the 
magnitude of th1s change as measured by serv1ces rendered 
and oap1tal needed to prov1de these commun1cat1on servioes. 
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Table VIII shows that while Personal Consumption 
Expenditures increased 234 per cent, Bell System Operating 
Revenues increased 521 per cent. From this. it would appear 
that in 1967, the Bell System received more than its 1946 
share of the consumers' dollars. The table also shows that 
there is a much larger quantity of the Bell System services 
demanded in 1967 than in 1946. 
TABLE VIII
 
COMPARISON. BETWEEN BELL SYSTE~l AND GENERAL ECONOMY (IN MILLIONS)
 
Fer Cent 
Item 1946 1950 1955) 1960 1967 Change 
GNP $203,700 $284,800 $398,000 $503,700 $785,000 285 
Personal Consumption
Expenditures $143,700 $191,000 $256,900 $325,200 $479,900 234 
Gross Private Domestic 
Investment $ 24,600 :$ 54,100 $ 67,400 $ 74,800 $109,300 344 
Bell System Total 
Operating Revenue $ 2,094 $ 3,262 $ 5,297 $ 7,920 $ 13,009 521 
Bell System Total 
Plant Investment $ 6,294 $ 10,102 $ 15,340 $ 24,072 $ 41,476 560 
Bell System Long Distance 
Interstate Messages 409 528 752 1,042 1,945 376 
Bell System Telephones 19 26 33 39 49 158 
Source:	 Bell S:stem Statistioal Manual, April, 1968, p. 102. 
Statistioal Abstpact 2! ~ United states. 1268, p. 314. 
\...U 
\...U 
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Another example of the quantitative growth for the 
Bell System since World War II is the residential telephone o 
This is the most widely used service, measured in terms of the 
number of instruments and the number of calls placed per 
instrument. 
TABLE IX 
TELEPHONES-BELL SYSTEM 
(IN THOUSANDS) 
December 31 Residence Business Total 
1946 15.500 3.478 18,978 
1950 21,858 4.175 26,033 
1955 27,780 4,899 32,679
1960 33,137 5,815 38.952 
1965 38,495 6,794 45.289 
1966 39,948 7,004 46,952 
1967 41,312 7,225 48,537 
Source: Bell System Statistical Manual, April. 1968, 
p. 504. 
Table IX shows the extent to whioh the number of tele­
phones has increased since 1946. 
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TABLE X 
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUES (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) 
Total Net inc as a 
Year Operating Revenues Net Income %of Ope Rev. 
1946 2,093,665 215,203 10.3 
1950 3,261,528 258,867 11.0 
1955 5,297,043 683,543 12.9 
1960 7,920,454 1,250,955 15.8 
1965 11,001,783 1,850,185 16.8 
1966 12,138,265 2,037,258 16.8 
1967 1 13,009,204 2,110,270 16.1 
Source: ~ System statistical Manual, April, 1968, 
p. 102. 
Bell System's revenues and net income have also been on 
the inorease. Table X shows the figures for selected years 
from 1946 to 1967. 
To increase income figures, additional investments were 
required by the Bell System. It needed more telephones, more 
central offioe equipment, more cables and wire, more bUildings, 
more of all kinds of oapital equipment, and a larger cash fund 
for daily expenditures. These finanoing expenditures have 
amounted to $49.4 billion since 1946. Bell System capital is 
now over seven times what it was in 1946! The term capital as 
it will be used when discussing financing needs to be defined. 
It means the dollar expenditures measured at original cost 
whioh are used to purchase land, equipment, buildings, cables 
and other related hardware necessary for communi oat ion. It 
also includes the cash fund or working capital necessary for 
payroll and voucher expenses on a day-to-day basis. 
The Bell System total corporate capital accounts for 
about 5 per cent of all corporate capital. 1 Its new financing 
since 1946 was about 14 per cent of total corporate financing 
and about 38 per cent of total corporate new equity financing.2 
In order to understand the relationship between the capital 
that has been acquired and the increased purchase of communi­
cation services, an analysis of the Bell System's construction 
expenditures is needed. These expenditures are for construc­
tion of three types. 
1.	 "Standing Still" expenditures. These construction 
expenditures would be required merely to keep the 
existing plant operating without any growth or modern­
ization. Essentially, these expenditures would be for 
replaoement of worn out or obsolete plant. 
2.	 Expenditures for growth. These expenditures would be 
those used for expansion to meet rising demand. An 
example of this type of expenditure would be the 
money required to put in additional switching equip­
ment, cables and telephones for a housing addition 1n 
a metropolitan area. 
IBell Slstem Statistical Manual, April, 1968, p. 418. 
2Ib1d• 
~ 
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'3. Expenditures for modernization and improvement of 
telephone plant. The Direct Distance Dialing program 
is a good example of this type of construction. It 
may be noted that this area of expenditure, after 
initially put in. could ultimately fall into the first 
two categories when replacement was required or when 
additions were needed. It should also be recognized 
that modernization or improvement expenditures could 
offset part of the standing still costs if the 
modernization expenditure took place at the time 
replacement would have been required for the old 
plant. If new types of central office equipment 
replaced old worn out central offioe equipment. then 
part of the expenditure would logically be allocated 
to standing still costs and the rest to modernization 
and improvement. The dollar division on this would 
be determined by the amount of dollars it would take 
to replace the old plant with like equipment. 
The standing still costs have accounted for about 14 per 
cent of total capital expenditures. modernization has accounted 
for about 22 per cent. while growth has acoounted for the 
remaining 64 per cent. 1 Therefore. we see that growth has been 
the largest factor in the demand for additional investment in 
the post World War II period. 
1Ibid., p. 606.
-
)8 
III. SUMMARY 
Th1s chapter has attempted to trace the progress of 
the general economy 1n the post World War II perlod. and to 
trace the growth of the Bell System durlng thls same perlod 
of tlme. 
The lnorease ln GNP ln the general economy was found 
to be a result of populatlon lncreases. teohnologlcal 1nnova­
tlons and government flscal and monetary pollcles. As a 
result, thls was a perlod of except10nal consumptlon and 
lnvestment expendltures. Thls perlod of tlme was also found 
to be mlldly lnflatlonary. 
The lncrease ln purchases of the Bell System servlces 
was found to be ahead of the purchases of goods and servlces 
ln the general economy durlng these years. Thls large 
lncrease was a result of the populatlon lnorease. a backlog 
of consumer demand created by World War II. technologlcal 
changes, a wlder range of servlces belng offered, government 
spendlng. lnternal Bell System priclng. and aggresslve mer­
chandlslng. Of course, as a result of thls lncreased demand 
there were large amounts of capital expendltures made by the 
Bell System. These expenditures were more than that of other 
corporatlons durlng thls perlod of time. 
The next few ohapters wll1 deal with an analysls of 
the various methods of flnanolng the oapltal needed to meet 
the demands of oonsumers. 
CHAPTER III 
FINANCING FROM BE:rAlNED EARNINGS AND DEPBECIATION" 
This chapter will discuss the financing that has been 
done by the Bell System from retained earnings. Closely 
related to any discussion concerning retained earnings is 
the discussion of rate regulation by the regulatory bodies 
and how they define the term "rate of return." 
I. RATE OF RETURN 
It is a general doctrine of American law for public 
utility co~panies operating under special franchises to 
1offer adequate service at nreasonable rates.· These reason­
able rates are generally left up to the management of the 
company so long as the company keeps within bounds set by 
public interest. Only rarely will a commission feel they 
should dictate precise rates that a oompany must charge. The 
usual action is deciding whether rate schedules are reasonable 
or unreasonable. The principle of reasonable rates are 
designed partly to resolve oonflicts between investors t to 
whom a rate of return means a source of income t and consumers t 
to whom it means an item of expense. 
1James C. Bonbr1ght, Pr1nciples of Public Utility Bates 
(New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1961)t p. 7-13. 
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In determinlng a falr price for telephone servloe, it 
has been recognized that prlce must at least exoeed the cost 
of providlng the servioe. Thls sounds like a slmple state­
ment. However, determinlng whether short-run or long-run 
cost should be used, whether original or replaoement cost 
should be used, or whether slmply operating costs plus some 
flxed dollar amount should be used has involved a lot of 
discussion. 
Looking at rulings from the Federal Communicatlons 
Commisslon, lt appears they have taken the origlnal cost plus 
a certain per cent polnt of view on the overall rate. 1 In 
other words, to establish a rate of return, a commisslon will 
first determine what the rate base should be. The FCC has 
determined that thls base should be the capltal ibvested in 
land, bu1ldings and equipment at thelr orlginal cost. Next a 
determination is made of what constitutes a fair rate of 
return on this base. If 100 ml11lon dollars 1s the rate base 
and rate of return 1s allowed at 7 per cent, then 7 million 
dollars is allowed when determinlng ~ates. The rates deter­
mined for such a flgure would be rates that would be flxed for 
a per10d of tlme. If publlc utl1ities were required to ralse 
and lower thelr rates year by year, it would be costly and 
inoonvenient to both the publl0 and the oompanies. 
1Ibid., p. 281-28;. 
~ 
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The most widely disputed legal point in the history of 
American public ut1l1ty regulation 1s whether to use original 
cost or cost of replacement when establishing the rate base. 
The utilities argue that the original cost isn't fair because 
to replace the eqUipment purchased years ago would be more oost17~· 
in today's enVironment. The FCC argues that to use other than 
the original cost would mean the consumer would be paying a 
prioe that was higher than necessary. The difference in rates 
allowed under these two systems would be qUite significant. 
The Bell System today is using an average capital rate base 
less depreciation reserve. whioh is an original cost rate base. 
The Bell System management has some definite feelings 
on earnings levels. In an interview. H. I. Romnes. Chairman 
of American Telephone and Telegraph Company stated: 
One of the oharacteristics of a utility--and 
certainly a telephone utility--is that it takes 
three dollars invested in capital to produce one 
dollar in revenue. With a manUfacturing company. 
the reverse is true. about one dollar in capital 
will yield three dollars in sales. 1 
He went on to say. ooncerning a reoent investigation of 
Bell system ratesl 
The first part had to do with our overall rate of 
return and the base on whioh it is figured. The 
Commission's initial decision on this part.
released about the middle of last year. appeared to 
limit our rate of return on interstate business to 
7.5 per cent. We immediately asked the oommission 
1-Future of the Telephone." £.2. News and World Report. 
LV (November 11. 1968). 90. 
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In its response, 
are by no 
precluded from improving our interstate 
Based on the Federal Communioations Commission's recent 
to reconsider this decision. 
the commission made it clear that we 
means 
earnings level above 7.5 per cent by our own 
efforts and this we have done. 
investigation, certain interstate toll rates have been adjusted 
to bring rates of return into the 7.5 per cent range. 
The Bell System believes that it should have a fair 
rate of return and at the same time provide service at a 
reasonable cost to the customer. If the rate of return were 
too high, more than likely the customers would be paying too 
much for their servioes. On the other hand, if the rate of 
return is too low, investors will not be attracted. 
II. BEVENUES 
As was pointed out in Chapter 11,1 the Bell System 
revenues have shown considerable growth since 1945. Some of 
the factors that contributed to this growth have already been 
examined. PopUlation growth, general eoonomic growth, 
changing price structures, and aggressive merohandising have 
created an increase in demand for telephone services and as a 
result have been contributing factors in helping the Bell 
System to inorease its revenues. 
1see Table X. 
Total operating revenue per telephone has increased 
from $86.83 in 1946 to $159.24 in 1967. 1 From 1957 to 1967, 
looal service revenue increased 6.1 per cent per year. 2 
During this same time long distance revenues grew 9.5 per cent 
per year. 
III. EXPENSES AND TAXES 
When figuring net income, expenses are deducted from 
revenues. The first item of expense to be examined is depre­
oiation and amortization. 
Table XI shows that depreciation as a per cent of 
operating revenues has inoreased more than the other expenses. 
The reason for this is that the amount invested in land, 
buildings, and equipment has inoreased by JJ billion dollars 
during this period of time. 3 It is interesting to note that 
the maintenanoe expense as a per oent operating revenues has 
aotually declined. Traffic expense has deolined as a per­
oentage of total operating revenue. The reason for this is 
the elimination of operators handling long distance oalls. 
In 19;4, ;.8 per oent of the long distance messages were 
4
oustomer dialed, whereas, 59.6 per oent were dialed in 1967. 
l aell szstem Statistioal Manual, April, 1968, p. 204. 
2lbid., p. 210. J,llli.• p. 402. 
4
~ 
Ibid •• p. 505. 
TABLE XI
 
OPERATING EXPENSES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATING BEVENUE
 
Traffio Commercial and Total Operating 
Year Maintenance ~prec1E1:tlon . ExJj~nl:Je .Mei.rk,etJl:l& ~~ense.___ _gpense 
1946 19.63 10.17 25.69 8.94 75.98 
1955 20.73 9.21 17.00 8.97 66.73 
1965 17.69 14.68 9.11 8.04 60.30 
1967 17.56 14.98 8.81 7.74 60.08 
Source: ~ System statistical Manual, April, 1968, p. 306. 
~
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The next item to be examined is operating efficienc7. 
Since the operating ratio describes that portion of each 
total revenue dollar which is spent on expenses (not including 
taxes), it is probably the best indicator of overall effi­
ciency. In the 1940's the Bell System's operating ratio 
averaged about 75 per cent. In the 1950's it was about 66 
per cent, and in the 1960's it was about 59 per cent. 1 The 
reduction from 75 per oent to 59 per cent represents a rising 
proportion of revenue that is available for tax payment, 
interest payments, dividend payments, or to be left as 
retained earnings. 
The next item to be considered is taxes. In 1946, Bell 
System taxes were $400 million and aocounted for 16.18 per 
2
oent of total expenses. In 1967, they were $2.9 billion and 
)6.79 per cent of total expenses. These increased taxes 
aocount for a much larger per oent of total expenses in 1967 
than they did in 1946. The per oent of taxes related to 
total operating revenue was about 17 per oent in the 1940's.) 
4In the 1960's, this amounted to about 22 per cent. 
Taking all factors into oonsideration, the overall 
operating ratio, including taxes, went from about 87 per cent 
in the 1940's to 82 per cent in the 1960's.5 
1Ibid., p. 402. 
~ 
)Ibld. 
5Ib1d • 
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IV. E.ARN"INGS 
As a per cent of total operating revenue, the money 
available for interest, dividends and surplus rose from 10 per 
cent in 1946 to about 20 per cent in 1967. 1 This was pri­
marily a result of decreased expenses in relationship to 
revenues. 
From 1946 through 1967 the Bell System earned about 
$20.7 billion net income. 2 Of the $20.7 billion, about .13.6 
billion were paid out in dividends. 3 The remaining $7.1 
billion have been available for financing new capital expen­
ditures. 
v. RETAINED EARNINGS 
Sinoe the total financing expenditures were $49.4 
billion from 1946 to 1967 and $7.1 billion came from retained 
earnings this amounted to 14.37 per cent of these dollars. 
Using retained earnings as a source of financing capi­
tal expenditures involves several considerations. First. it 
might be better to repay debts or increase dividends to 
stookholders. By repaying debts the fixed expense of interest 
1Ibid • 2Ibid., p. 103.
-
31b1d• 
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charges might be reduced. If dividends are increased it 
might be easier to attract investors in the future. 
second, the retained earnings might be invested in 
another company. By law the Bell System is prohibited from 
doing this. SO this option is not open to the Bell System. 
Third, the retained earnings might be more profitably 
invested in bonds. 
Overall, by reinvesting retained earnings the system 
has a cost involved. This cost is called opportunity cost. 
It 1s the d1fference between what could be earned outside the 
system and the rate of return within the system. 
The portion of financ1ng expenditures coming from 
retained earnings has 1ncreased since the 1940·s. In the 
1940's retained earnings aooQunted for about 7 per cent of 
total construction expenditures. In the 1950's this same 
figure was about 8 per cent and in the 1960's it was 19 per 
1cent. 
During this period of time the rate of return on orig­
inal cost rose from about 5.5 per cent in the 1940's to about 
7.8 per oent in the 1960's. This increased rate of return is 
far below other companies during this same period of time. 
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VI. DEPBECIATION1. 
A second souree of finanoing available to the Bell 
System has been depreciation. In the Bell System, funds pro­
vided from depreciation have accounted for 38.66 per cent of 
total financing expenditures since 1945. 1 In the 1940's de­
preciation acoounted for about 27 per cent of total financing 
and was 37 per oent and 43 per cent in the 1950's and 1960's 
respectively. 2 
The Bell System uses a basic straight line method of 
depreciation. The depreciation rates are approved in the 
standard system of accounts as prescribed by the Federal Com­
munlcations Commission. All plant is divided into one of 
various classes of plant. Examples of these classes might 
include wire, poles, central office equipment, bUildings, and 
cable. 
For example, depreciation rate for a dial crossbar 
oentral office in Iowa is 3.1 per cent.) This means that the 
antioipated life of this olass of equipment is about thirty­
two years. Data Processing equipment has a depreciation rate 
1Ibid •• p. 302. 
JNorthwestern Bell Aocountin~ Praotice, Northwestern 
Bell Telephone Compan~ctober, 19 5, p. 72. 
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of 22.5 per cent or a lifetime of about four and one-half 
1 years. The motor vehicle class has a depreciation rate of 
11., per cent and buried cable has a 1.5 per cent rate. 2 A1~ 
of these rates are applied to the original cost. 
Growth of the telephone business and technological 
developments affect the serv1ce life of telephone plant. 
Growth in the number of customers and growth in use of ser­
vice eventually causes central office eqUipment, cable and 
other facilities to become inadequate or economically unsuited 
for service. These facilities must be replaced with eqUipment 
and plaht of increased capacity and quality. Other reasons 
for replaoing equipment include physical deterioration, 
obsolescence, and removals for urban construction. 
Costs of depreciation are shown on the financial books 
as accruals in the depreciation reserve. However, this does 
not mean that the money is actually held in a separate account 
to be used to replace worn-out plant at some future date. In 
other words, the money is transferred from the original plant 
to the depreciation reserve. 
In the telephone business, as in any other business, 
depreciation must be oonsidered as one of the costs of doing 
business. Equipment is used up in the prooess of providing 
service through growth, obsolescence, or physical deterioration. 
50 
This can be seen by the different rates applied to the various 
classes. Data processing equipment may not wear out in four 
and one-half years, but new models on the market will make the 
old models obsolete. Underground cable is hard to improve 
upon and has little physical deterioration. Therefore, it is 
expected to last about sixty-seven years. 
Since 1957,1 depreciation accruals have amounted to 
$14.4 billion. During this same period of time, replacing 
worn equipment has cost $7.7 billion, growth has accounted for 
$21.9 billion spent on new plant and equipment, and moderniza­
tion costs were $4.8 billion. 2 From this it can be Been that 
depreciation has just barely covered modernization and replace­
ment costs. From these figures it would appear, since the 
amount of depreciation exceeds replacement costs, that depre­
ciation has been more than enough to cover inflation in 
prices. However, it must be remembered that part of the costs 
assigned to growth were, 1n fact, replacements of old equip-
mente 
In comparing Bell System's depreciation expense to the 
capital consumption allowances in the general economy, it is 
seen that the Bell System's depreciation expense has increased 
lprior to 1957 Aocounting procedures did not separate 
construction expenditures between growth, modernization and 
standing still. 
2Eall System Statistical Manual, April, 1968, p. 606. 
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about 400 per cent while tak1ng figures from the national 
inoome accounts shows that the cap1tal oonsumption allowanoes 
in the general economy has increased only 250 per cent. 1 
This shows that the amount of capital depreciation in the 
Bell System has certainly exceeded the growth of the general 
economy. 
There are oosts involved in using depreciat10n as a 
method of financing. The Bell System has used about $19.1 
billion dollars from depreciation reserves since 1945 to help 
finance its new construction. The cost involved in this 
financing is similar to using retained earnings for financing 
because the question that needs to be answered is whether it 
1s more prof1table to reinvest these dollars or should they .J 
be invested elsewhere to make more money. 
The Bell System would not invest by loaning the dollars 
to a bank. Here they could have received about 5 per cent on 
the investment. Their earnings today are about 7.5 per cent. 
Theretore, the additional 2.5 per cent makes it attractive to 
invest in communicat1on services. 
L1ke dollars from retained earnings, these dollars could 
be used to increase dividends or pay oft past debt. The deter­
mining factor here is whether adding or replacing plant would 
lstat1st1cal Abstraot 2£ ~he United states, 1968, p. 
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be more profitable to the stockholders. Assuming the deci­
sion has already been made that it is profitable to invest in 
additional plant, depreciation provides a good souroe for 
finanoing. Thts 1s true although depreoiation. is designed to 
provide for the reoovery of plant used up in the prooess of 
~rovidlng service. 
VII. s~y 
Bell System revenues have increased substantially since 
1946. Part of thi s inorease was due to the general economic 
oonditions during this period.. The rest of the inorease has 
been a reault of the Bell System- s aggressive revenue gener­
~t\?l'g p}'O'gft'lh'S. 
Operating effioienoies have inoreased since 1946. The 
operating ratio has improved about 16 per cent from the 1940's 
to the 1960's. 
The inoreased revenue and decreased costs have been 
partially passed on to the customer through lower rates •. The 
remaining dollars have been returned to stockholders through 
divid.ends and reinvested in the business. Financing from 
retained earnings has accounted for 14.37 percent of total 
financing expenditures since 1945. 
The FCC has controlled the Bell System's earnings and 
rate of return. However. they now state that the Bell System 
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can earn over 7.5 per cent if this oan be done through gen­
erated requests for their service or through increased 
efficiencies. 
Although there are costs inVolved with using retained 
earnings for financlngt this method of financing is less 
expensive than the other alternatives. 
Depreoiation reserves have prOVided funds for 38.66 
per cent of total financing since 1945. Like retained earnings. 
this method of financing is less expensive than using outside 
sources. 
1 
aEiAPTER IV
 
DEBT AND EQUITY FINANCING
 
The last chapter pointed out that since 1945. 14.37 per 
cent of capital financing has come from retained earnings and 
38.66 per cent has come from depreciation accruals. The 
balance needed for financing has come from outside financing 
in the form of debt and equity financing. The amount of 
money raised thrOUgh these two methods was $23.2 billion. 1 
I. DEBT FINANCING 
Of the $23.2 billion raised in the form of new money. 
about $10.9 billion have come in the form of debt. 2 This 
means that debt financing has aocounted for 21.66 per cent of 
total financing since 1945. Of total capital assets valued 
at original cost ~ 1967. debt financing accounted for about 
36 per oent of the total caPital. 3 The range of this per cent 
since 1940 has been from a low of 31 per cent to a high of 53 
4per oent. This per cent is what is commonly referred to as 
the debt ratio and has averaged about 35 per cent since 1920. 5 
l Be1l System Statistical Manual, April. 1968. p. 407. 
2Ib1d• 
4Ibid•
 
5Bell System Finanoing. July. 1961. p. 8.
 
than 35 per oent. 
operated on 
larly vulnerable to depression, are not quite as safe as an 
electric utility. The prime reason for this is the large 
fluctuations that can take place in toll revenues. Since toll 
revenues make up such a large part of revenues currently (in 
1967 it was 44 per cent1), the danger of earnings fluctuating 
wi th the general economy is much more real today than it has 
been in the past. For these reasons the amount of debt in its 
total capital assets has always been carefully kept below a 
50 per cent debt ratio. The reason for the ourrent objective 
being somewhat above 35 per oent is really related to eqUity 
finanoing. In the recent Federal Communications Commission's 
investigation, the Bell System was arguing for about 8 per 
cent return on original cost. The Federal Communications 
Commission said what is really needed is a 9 or 10 per cent 
return on eqUity. Therefore, this can be achieved by more 
2debt financing. The Bell System hesitantly agreed. The 
validity of these reasonings will ~ examined in a later chapter. 
In the past, when the debt ratio was pressing the 35 
per cent mark, the Bell System deoided to issue oonvertible 
l Eel1 System Statistical Manual, April, 1968, p. 202. 
2Telecommunication Reports, september, 1969, p. 19. 
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The Bell System current debt ratio objective is higher 
By tradition the Bell System has always 
the theory that its earnings, while not particu­
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debentures. The advantages to these are considerable. Ear17 
in its life, when the proceeds from the sale still are being 
invested, the debenture carries only the normal interest 
charges of a bond. Later, when the property is showing 
earnings, it can be converted into stock at the option of the 
Bell system. This conversion has the effect of reducing both 
the debt ratio and fixed interest charges.
 
There is. however. at least one disadvantage to the
 
~~	 stockholder when the convertible debentures are issued. The 
net effect of oonverting these debentures is to dilute the 
equity in company earnings represented by eXisting shares. 
Debt financing has a known cost involved. This cost 
is the interest paid on the debt and is deductible as an 
expense when figuring taxes. However, as a rule of thumb, net 
income before deducting interest should be at least three 
times the amount of interest charges to insure that the fixed 
interest charges can be met. The Bell System's net income 
has averaged between five and six times fixed interest charges 
since 1945. 1 
When considering using debt financing, the cost of this 
finanoing must be compared to what this investment will earn. 
In 1946, the cost of new debt was about 2.5 per cent and the 
t Bell Slstem statistioal Manual, April, 1968, p. 10). 
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During th1scost of new debt 1n 1967 was almost 6 per cent. 1 
same period of time the Bell System's earn1ngs went from 5.72 
1n 1946 to 7.77 in 1967.2 In 1946, money borrowed could earn 
about 3.2 per cent over its cost. In 1967 this same figure 
amounted to only about 1.8 per cent. 
There 1s another argument for keeping the debt ratio 
low. This argument 1mplies that the more debt there is. the 
greater the cost for borrowing more money. In other words. 
the greater the amount of debt, the greater the risk and, 
therefore, the interest charged must be more to compensate for 
this additional risk. However, w1th the Bell System. this 
fact cannot be trUly substantiated since most Bell System 
bonds issued carry Moody's rating of ABa. 
Most of the above discussion represents part of the 
reasons why the Bell System has used some debt financing. 
The argument as to how much should be used will be examined 
in a later ohapter when a critique of the Bell System financl~~ 
is made. 
II. EQUITY FINANCING 
The Bell System has raised $12., billion since 1945 
through equ1ty financ1ng.) This has accounted for 25.3 per 
oent of total financing since that time. 
l Eel1 System Financing, July, 1967. p. 9. 
~ 
System Statistical Manual. April, 1968, p. 102.2Bell 
~ 
J lb1d., p. 414. 
~ 
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'In 1946, the Bell System management had authorized 
$2.5 billion par value of Amerioan Telephone and Telegraph 
lCompany stOOk. This grew over the years to an authorizatiom 
of $10 billion in 1967. Of th1s $10 billion, $9 billion have 
been issued, with $7 billion having been issued since 1945. 
Much of the equ1ty oapital has come from the conversion 
of debentures or bonds. This is shown in Table XII.' cumula­
tive through 1967, 52 per cent of equity finance has come from 
this souroe. 
TABLE XII 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AT&T COMPANY STOCK ISSUED BY SOURCE 
( CUMULATIVE) 
Year 
Conversion of Bonds 
or Debentures 
Employee Stook 
Plans 
stock 
Offerings 
1946 30 9 61 
1950 47 10 4) 
1955 65 12 23 
1960 60 14 26 
1965 53 18 29; 
1967 52 20 28 
statistical Manual, April, 1968,Source: J?ill. 8yB t em .::::.::.:::..;;.:.:::;.;;..;............. :,:=.;::;;;,;;;;.
 
p. 414. 
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TABLE XIII 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SHABES BY NUMBER OF SHABEs HELD OF 
AT&!r COMPANY STOCK 
yea.r 1-60 Shares 61-599 Shares 600 Shares and Over 
1945 9.4 43.5 47.1 
1955 5.8 42.2 52.0 
1965 6.6 41.2 52.2 
1967 7.2 41.7 51.1 
Source: ~ system Statistioal Manual, April, 1968, 
p. 908. 
The majority of the share owners own 600 or more shares. 
Some of these are insurance companies and banks. However, as , 
we saW in Table XII many of the shares have been purchased by 
employees. The employee stock plan gives employees the oppor­
tunity to puroha.se shares at 85 per cent of the market price. 
This gives the employee an added benefit and theoretically 
some incentive to work harder in the business. Many of the 
1Share owners that hold 61 or more shares are emplOyees. 
Like any other stock, the attractiveness of AT&T stock 
is determined by several factors. Some of these factors will 
be examined as they relate to the Bell System. 
l Ib1d., p. 908. 
--
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big faotor in determining how attraotive 
oan first be measured as a return 
This is oomputed 
Earnings are a 
a stook will be. Earnings 
on equity capital instead of total oapital. 
by dividing the investment of AT&T oompany share owners valued 
at par plus premiums and surplus into total income after 
expenses and taxes but before deducting interest charges. In 
1946, return on eqUity capital was 7.08. In 1967, this same 
figure was 9.73. 1 When a oomparison is made between return on 
equity and the return on total capital (meaning all capital 
from all sources), the relationship remains about the same 
from 1946 to 1967. Return on total oapital figure is about 
80 per cent of return on equity oapital figure. 
Another measure of how attraotive a stook might be is 
its earnings per share. In 1946, Amerioan Telephone and 
Telegraph Company oonsolidated earnings were $1.58 per share. 2 
In 1967, the per share earnings were $3.79 per share. 3 There­
fore, per share earnings inoreased 140 per cent during this 
period. 
Two other measures of desirability of a given stock 
are dividends and growth potential for either the stock, the 
oompany, or both. 
p. 108.1Ibid• 2Ibid., 
)Ibid. 
~ 
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Amer1can Telephone and Telegraph Company's policy has 
been to keep the div1dends somewhat stable and to increase 
them only when the oompany feels the new dividend can be main­
tained over the long run. AT&T stook has often been referred 
to as the stook whioh acts like a bond. It has paid a regular 
annual d1vidend since 1922. The Bell System Management has 
always felt there was a place for this kind of solid inoome 
equity security. Since 1940, there have been four years when 
dividend payments have exoeeded earnings. The total amount 
paid out during these years that wasn't covered by earnings 
amounted to 35.2 million dollars. In 1946, American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company was paying $1.50 dividends per share 
and the yield (defined as dividend per share/current market 
price per share) was about 5.16 per cent. In 1967, it was 
paying $2.25 diVidend per share and yielding 4.10 per cent. 
It oan be seen that although dividends have increased, the 
yield on the price of AT&T has declined. 
Dividends from time to time have been dsweetened d with 
rights to buy more stock at bargain prices. In 1952, stock­
holders received rights worth roughly $2.21 per share, followed 
by a right worth $2.43 per share a year later. 1 Another rights 
offering, in 1955, was worth $3.45 a share and in 1956, rights 
2 
were issued worth $6.92 a share. 
l Ball Syste~ Financing, July, 1967, p. 11. 
2rbid • 
~ 
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The growth potential or anticipation of market price 
increase is another factor which affects investors' desire to 
buy stock. AT&T stock has had a fairly good growth record up 
through 1965. If a stockholder bought ten shares in 1946, he 
would have paid about $1,682.50 for his stoCk. 1 Exercising 
rights received and buying more rights where he had more than 
half the required number, would have meant a net additional 
outlay of $696.34 after dividends. By 1958 his holdings would 
have increased to thirty shares of common stock worth $5,160. 
The net gain for this period would be about $2,781. 
However, since 1965, the growth record has been very 
discouraging. When the FCC announced their intent to investi­
gate the Bell System's earnings and price structure, the price 
of the stock fell off considerably. In 1964, the stock 
2 6averaged $69.90 per share for the year. In 197, its average 
selling price was $54.87 • 
•~~other factor whioh investors will consider is the 
price-earnings ratio, defined as current market price divided 
by current earnings per share. In 1946 this ratio was about 
20 for AT&T stock and was about 14 in 1967.3 Of course the 
smaller the ratio the better the return based on earnings. 
lIbido 
Zeall system statistical I~ual. April, 1968, p. 108. 
3Th1d• 
6; 
Another measure of a company's operation is the 
"Capital turnover" ratio. This is total sales or operating 
revenues divided by the total assets of a company. An up­
ward trend of this ratio is favorable, showing that the volume 
of sales is grOWing relative to the volume of assets dedicated 
to sales. As a guideline public utilities normally should 
turn over assets once in five years or have about a 20 per 
cent capital turnover ratio. In both 1946 and in 1967 the 
Bell System had about a 40 per cent capital turnover ratio. 
Turning over assets about every two and one-half years indi­
cates that the Bell System is in a good position. 
Some of the problems with financing through eqUity will 
be examined further in the next chapter. Here an attempt has 
been made to examine factors affecting the willingness of 
investors to buy AT&T stock. All possible ratios have not 
been examined because most of them would help arrive at the 
same conclusion. AT&T is fatrly conservative 'blue-chip' 
stock. 
III. SUMMARY 
The Bell System has used debt to finance 21.66 per cent 
of total financing since 1945. The debt ratio has averaged 
about 35 per cent since 1920. The reason for keeping it low 
has been to protect investors during reoessions. 
> 
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The cost of debt has been on the increase. This has 
lessened the margin between rate of return and the cost of 
debt. However, the Bell System has still raised $10.7 billion 
from 1946 to 1967 through this method of finaneing. Equity 
financing has accounted for 25.30 per oent of total financing 
since 1945. 
Several factors affecting the desirability of buying 
AT&T stock were examined. These factors were earnings on total 
capital, earnings on eqUity capital, earnings per share, yield 
and dividend policy, growth potential, price-earnings ratio, 
and turnover ratio. Basically, AT&T stock has proven to be a 
fairly attractive conservative stock. Since 1965 its desir­
ability has decreased due to its poor market performanoe. 
CHAPTER V 
BELL SYSTEM FINANCING--ANALYSIS 
Total oonstruction expenditures since 1945 have 
amounted to $48.7 billion. In addition, the dollars needed 
in a oash fund have also increased. This cash fund is used 
for payroll expense and other miscellaneous expenses needed 
to operate the telephone business on a day-to-day basis. This 
cash fund increased by $.7 billion fro. 1946 through 1967. 1 
Therefore, the total money needed by the Bell System during 
this period was $49.4 billion. Table XIV shows the total 
breakdown in dollars and percentages of sources of the total 
financ1ng sinoe 1945. 
TABLE XIV
 
BELL SYSTEM FINANCING (1946-1967)
 
Total Dollars Per cent of 
(Bil11ons of Dollars) Total 
Retained Earnings 7.1 14.:37 
Depre eia.tion 19.1 38.66 
Debt 10.7 21.66 
EqUity ~ 25.30 
Total Bell System Finano1ng 49.4 99.99 
Source: Bell System ~tat1s tloaI Manual, April, 1968, 
p. 418. 
slstem Statlst1ofq, Manual, April, 1968, p. 421.I 13e11 
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The "best means of financing" may be defined as the one 
that permits the company to meet the demand of telephone users 
at the lowest possible cost and yields the highest return tor 
the company. With the distinct advantage of hindsight, the 
rest of this chapter will attempt to evaluate whether the 
best means of finanoing were used. 
As described in earlier chapters there are costs 
involved in using debt, eqUity, depreciation or retained 
earnings as a souroe of finanoing. However, using deprecia­
tion and retained earnings does not involve an actual cost 
outlay. There is an actual oost outlay involved in debt 
financing. Equity finanoing also has a eost outlay if inves­
tors are to be attracted. Table XV shows the oosts in various 
years 1946 to 1967. 
TABLE XV: 
COST OF DEBT AND EQUITY FINANCING 
SELECTED YEARS FROM 1946 TO 1967 (IN PER CENT) 
Imbedded Cost Imbedded Cost 
Year of Debt of Equity 
1946 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1967 
2.29 
).04
2.86 
3.52 
3.81 
4.00 
6.82 
6.)4
5.82 
5.98 
5.79 
5.90 
Source I S··.·tati.stical ~nual, April, 1968.Bell Slstem .:::.:.::::.:.:::.0.......__ :':_:;;,:;;;,;0........
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The 1mbedded cost of debt was f1gured by d1v1d1ng total 
debt as or December 31 of each year 1nto total· interest charges 
on th1s debt. The imbedded cost of equity was figured by 
diVid1ng total eqUity cap1tal (valued at par plus premiums and 
surplus) 1nto total d1vidends paid. 
Since retained earn1ngs and depreciat10n do not have an 
actual cost outlay involved it would be appropriate to deter­
mine if any outs1de financing was aotually required. 
Total financing required was $49.4 billion. Since 
depreciation raised $19.1 billion, this leaves $30.3 billion 
to be raised rrom other souroes. Assume eqUity and debt 
financing fixed as 1945. Also assume related payments on this 
financing fixed as of the same year. As of 1945 there were 
118,925.000 shares of stock outstanding. These shares were 
paid $178.388,000 1n that year. There were also other 
minority interests, primarily preferred stock, paid $13,550,000 
in dividends in 1945. 1 
If the same payments were fixed over the twenty-two 
year period, a partial 1noome statement for the twenty-two 
years would be as follows. 
$25,309,316,0002 Total Inoome 
5,603,355,000Dividend Payments
 
Total Available for Interest
 19,705,961,000Payments and Investment 
-
p. 102.1Ibid., p. 103. 2Ibid., 
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In 1946 the Bell System had about $1.8 billion in 
funded debt. Interest payments on this debt amounted to 
$46, )26,000. A.ssuming this remained fixed over the twenty­
two year period,l total interest pa.ymentswould have amounted 
to $1,019,172,000. Deducting this from the total available 
for interest payments and investment results in $18.72 
b1llion available for investment. Since total financing 
reqUired (outside of depreciation) was $30.3 billion and $18.1 
b1llion could have oome from retained earnings, this still 
leaves $11.6 billion to be ra1sed from outside sources. 
Therefore, some oombination of' retained earnings plus debt or 
eqUity financing would have to be used. 
From reviewing Table XV 1t appears that debt financing 
would have been much cheaper than equlty financing. Since 
debt has a tax advantage and stock financing has other costs 
involvael, the differenoe would be greater than shown. This 
difference w1ll be seen in the following para.graphs. 
To see whether debt financing is actually cheaper, an 
examInation of an alternate method of finanoing will be made. 
This examination will be hypothetical even though the figures 
used will be taken from aotual Bell System statistios. There 
are a few assumptions that need to be made at the start. 
1Th1S 1s a weak assumption since interest charges would 
have increased when debt was renewed. 
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First, services purehased by customers will be taken as they 
actually were since 1945, then the internal effioieneies pro­
duced by the company will remain as they actually happened. 
The rate struotures, governmental policies, and amounts of 
investment will remain as they aotually were. In other words, 
the only variables will be interest charges and debt financing, 
dividends paid and equity financing, and financing from retained 
earnings. Varying these sourees of finaneing could also have 
an effect on taxes paid, rate of return, and other financial 
figures. 
In order to treat these variables in the hypothetical 
example it would work better to combine all the data for the 
years 1946 to 1967 and treat it as if it ocourred during one 
fiscal year. 
In doing this Table XVI presents the statistios needed. 
Assume that from 1946 to 1967 no equity f1~~clng was 
added. Also assume that the total additional financing, 
outside of depreoiation, oame from debt financing and retained 
earnings. The total amount of debt required can be obtained 
from the following oaloulations. 
~------_ .• 
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TABLE XVI 
COI1IBlNED SELECTED FINANCIAL FIG.U'Dli'S 
4loI;I 1946	 TO 1967 
=: : :	 
.­
* Total depreciation Reserve1 19,137,000.000
** Total Income2 25,309.316,000
* Total Fixed Charges (Mostly Interest)3 4,559,363.000
**	 Total Fixed Charges (held at the 1945 
level x 22 years) 1.019,172,000
** Total Dividend Paymenta4 5,603,355,000
** Total Capital Obligations, 
Premiums and Surplus5 354,357,000,000
* Total Financing Required	 49,400,000,0006** Composite rate of retyrn 5.86
** Imbedded Cost of DebtY .033 
* Actual Figures. ** Hypothetical Figures. 
Sources ~ Sxstem Statistical Manual, April, 1968, 
p. 201-304. 
1This figure was an addition of depreciation reserved 
and net salvage for the years 1946 through 1967. 
2This figure was an addition of total income which is 
income atter deducting expanses and taxes but before deducting 
interest payments for the years 1946 through 1967. 
3This figure was an addition of the fixed charges paid 
in the years 1946 through 1967. 
4This figure was obtained by multiplying the 1945 dollars 
of dividends payments x 22 years plus giving the 118,925,000 
shares the increases in dividend payments as they actually 
ocourrecL 118.925,000 was the number of shares that were out­
standing in 1945. The figures actually used follow, with the 
first parenthesis being, the increase in dividend above the 
$1.50 per share paid in 1945 and the second parenthesis being 
the number of years ~aid; 118,925,000 (.11) (9)+(.15)(8)+(26) 
(7)-(.30)(6)+(.50)(4)+(.55)(3)+(.70 )(2)+(.75)(1) $1,380,719,250• 
This figure plus $4.222,636,000 = $5,603,355,000. 
is the total capital that must be earned on valued5This 
at original cost. It includes equity capital valued at par 
plus	 premiums and surplUS. It also ino1udes debt oapital. 
6This figure was obtained by dividing total net income
 
after taxes and interest deduotions for the years 1946 through
 
1967 by the average oapital obl18~tions premiums. end surplUS
 
for this same period of time. The figureS actually used were 
-
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Total financ1ng required
less depreciation as a =$49.4 billion 
source---;;,;;;.;;;;;,;:;.,;:::;.~------__~=:...i19.1 bil110n 
Equals amount to be f1nanoed 
=$30.3 bill10nLess amount which could be
 
financed by retained earn­

ings
 = z 
Equals amount which would
 
require debt finanoing = X
 
X may be defined as $30.3 billion - Z 
Z may be oalculated as follows: 
Total income - Interest on New Debt-dividend payments­
interest on debt already inourred = retained earnings, 
or--­
325.J09.J19,OOO-(.033)(11.5)1(X)-$5,603.355 000­
$1.019.172.000=Z • 
Since Z is stated in terms of X and since X = #30.3 
billlon-Z. by substitution we obtain the following equation 1n 
terms of Z--­
as follows: Net Income = $20,749,953.000; and average capital 
obligations. premiums and surplus = $354.357,000.000. 
7This figure was obtained by dividing total fixed charges 
for the years 1946 through 1967 by the total debt oapital. The 
figures actually used were as follows: Total Fixed Charges 
$4,559.363,000; and total debt capital = $139.375,000.000. 
IThe new debt would not be paid interest the fUll 22 
years. The 11.; 1s the number of years the debt would be paid 
assuming 1/22nd of the debt capital was added each year. The 
11.5 was derived as follows: (X!22)(.033)(22+21+20+19+18 •.•• 1) 
=X (.033)(11.5). This probably slightly overstates the 
interest charges since more of the capltal was actually added 
in later years. 
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$25,J09,J16,OOO-(.033}(11.5}($30,300,OOO,OOO_Z}_$5,60J,J55,000-$l,019,172.000=Z
 
Solving:
 
Z = $11,422,947.623
 
X = $18,877,052.377 
In other words, without increasing equity financing 
$11.4 billion could come from retained earnings, $18.9 billion 
would be required from debt financing. and $19.1 billion from 
depreciation. 
An examination of this hypothetical type of financing 
is 1n order. Following 1s a partial income statement treating 
this twenty-two period as one fiscal year, and a summary of 
the actual versus hypothetical methods of financing. 
Total Income (As it actually eXisted) $25,309,316,000
Less: Interest on old debt 1.019.172,000
Less: Interest on new debt (11.5 years
.033 interest x $18,877,052,377) 7.153,841.272 
Net Income 17.136,302,728 
Plus Income Tax Advantage (.50 x difference
 
between new interest payments

$8,173.013,272 
and interest payments as 
they eXisted 4.558,363,000) 1.806.625.136 
Adjusted Net Income 18,943.127.864 
Bate of Return (Adjusted Net Income/ 
Total Capital Obligat ions Premiums 
and surplus from Table XVI.) 
Earnings per Share (Adjusted Net Income) 
(22 years X 118,925.000 # of shares) 
5.35 
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ACTUAL METHODS USED PROPOSED METROD 
Depreoiation Financing 19.1 billionDebt Financing 19.1 billion10.7 billionEquity Finanoing 18.9 billion;12·5 billionRetained Financing none7.1 billionRate of Return 11.4 billion 
Earnings per Share 5.86 5.35$3.79 (Highest 7.24 year 1967) 
From observing the above figures. the hypothetioal 
method of financing appears to have some advantages over the 
actual method used. The rate of return would be lower, but 
total outside financing required would be less and earnings 
per share would be much higher. Using this combination of 
financing would be cheaper. Annual debt costs would be 
about $80).5 million. (This is figured by taking the imbedded 
cost of debt in 1967. 4~ x total debt of about $20 billio~) 
As oan be seen in the following caloulations even thOUgh this 
annual debt cost 1s a little over $3 million more than debt 
costs as they actually existed in 1967. this method of 
financing is cheaper. 
The following comparison is ShOii'D. to examine the year 
1967 if the hypothetical method of finanoing had been used. 
1967 Figures Under 
Actual 1967 Figures Proposed Method 
Total Income $2,591,691,000 $2.591.691,000 
Lessl Interest Charges $ 481, 421,000 $ 805,831.095 
Plus tax advl.Ultage None $ 162,205,047 
Net Income $1,948,064,952$.2,.110,270,000
Lese DiVidends $1,.327,425,000 $ 379,265,250 
Retained Earnings $ 782,845,000 $1,568,799,702 
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In 1967 there was a requirement for about $4.3 billion 
additional in the Bell System. If the proposed method of 
financing had been used, $2 billion could have come from 
depreciation, $1.57 billion from retained earnings, and $.73 
billion from debt financing. As it actually happened $2 
billion came from depreciation, $.8 billion from retained 
earnings, $1.3 billion from debt issues, and $.2 billion from 
stock issues. Therefore, total outside financing was $.77 
billion higher than it needed to be. 
Considering all these items, the natural question is 
why the Bell System chose to use so much eqUity financing. 
The answer to this question centers around the Bell System's 
decision to keep their debt ratio at about 35 per cent. Under 
the proposed method the debt ratio would be about 58 per cent. 
There are several reasons given by the Bell System for keeping 
the debt ratio at 35 per cent. 
First, the risks of the Bell System have discouraged 
the management from wanting a large amount of fixed interest 
payments annually. The Bell System's assets are highly 
speoialized in nature. The System's activities are directed 
speoifioally toward the business of providing communications 
and, therefore, there 1s little flexibility in being able to 
utilize oommitted costs or fixed costs for other than their 
. Mn~y other businesses canspecific oommunioation purposes. r~~ 
t ther Eleotricd1 vert fixed cost s from one produot line 0 ano, . • 
--------- 1_
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utilities can utilize their assets for more th 
an one purpose. 
such as power, lighting, space heating or air-conditioning. 
About 10 cents out of every Bell System revenue dollar is 
absorbed in variable costs. Therefore, the Bell System is 
far more "locked in" in its cost structure. Manufacturers 
have almost 70 cents ot variable costs per dollar and electrics 
almost 20 centeo! During periods of sales declines, manUfac­
turers can "back out" of their cost structures at the rate of 
70 cents per dollar of revenue drop. The Bell System has no 
such inherent advantage in reducing its cost. 
Technological chBL~ge and innovation require large and 
continuous investments by the Bell System. This demonstrates 
a certain amount of risk. The Bell System's management feels 
their revenues are also sensitive to changes in the economic 
enVironment. However, the effect is not as large as on manu­
facturers but is larger than with electric companies. With 
increasing toll revenues relative to local service the manage­
ment of the Bell System feels that risks have increased over 
the years. Because of the risks involved, having fixed 
interest charges indicates a finanalal risk to the oompany 
and to the stockholders. A large drop in revenues could mean 
that revenues would not oover the interest oharges. 
1 R]Jeoodlng FCC's Signal." Business Week, (July. 15, 
1967), 120. 
--------~
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Also, the cost that must be paid f 
or new debt has been 
rising faster than the cost paid on new eqUity. While the 
cost of new debt dOUbled from 1946 to 1967, the cost of new 
equity has risen only slightly. With this rising cost of 
debt it became less and less attractive to use debt as a 
method of financing. 
Probably the most important reason for a low debt 
ratio is the Bell System's obligation to provide telephone 
service to anyone who is willing to pay for it. As seen 
previously. the ability to provide the telephone service has 
required much financing. In many foreign countries it is 
not uncommon to wait for three or four months to get resi­
dential telephone service. In the United states the Bell 
System feels it is not good. service if a customer has to wait 
more than two days for a telephone. In order to provide this 
kind of service, customer demand must be anticipated and con­
struction dollars spent to meet it. !herefore. an avenue of 
finanoing must always be left open. YU". G. L. Levy. who was 
testifying 1n the recent FCC investigation said. "Fortunately, 
AT&T had a borrowing margin afforded by the 31 per cent debt 
ratio at the end of the war. Otherwise, it is doubtful if it 
could have raised all the oapital it did."1 In 1942. 1944. 
1Ba.te of Return Testimon.l.' FCC Testimo& SUmmarl, May. 
1966 t p. 34. 
--------
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1945, and 1947, AT&T did not earn enough to cover its divi­
dend. They were then forced to rely on debt financing. The 
heavy relianoe on debt issues caused the debt ratio to rise 
to 54 per cent. Investors downgraded Bell System bonds which 
sold in the market on a medium grade basis. 
At the end of 1964 the average debt ratio for the 30 
major Dow Jones industrials was 14 per cent. 1 Those with the 
highest bond ratings had the lowest debt ratios. If the Bell 
System does not report good earnings and if its debt ratio is 
too high then it will have trouble raising capital. Only if 
it can attract capital will it be able to provide service to 
customers when needed. By keeping the debt ratio at a low 
level, debt financing is always open if equity financing runs 
into trouble because of poor market performance. 
John J. Soanlon, Vice President and Treasurer of AT&Jr 
in 1966, summed this up in his testimony. He said, 
As such, oapital structure is fundamentally a matter 
of management judgment •••• For the Bell System, we 
believe that as a long-term objective this range
shOUld be between 30 and 40 per cent of total capital. 
Faotors underlying this judgment include risk con­
sideration, the need to maintain high grade cred1t to 
provide flexibility in our finanoing and to assure 
our ability to finance soundly the growth of the 
business the tact ordinarily that the cost of debt 
is less than the earnings :requirement on equity ca~ital. 
and the income deductibility of interest on debt. 
1 2 Ibid •• p. 39 • 
~Iblde. p. 35. 
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Some discussion would be appropriate to see if the 
reasons given for the 30 to 40 per cent debt ratio are valid. 
First the Bell System does have a certain amount of risk and 
its fixed oosts are generally higher than other businesses. 
However, since 1922 the Bell System has not missed g1ving a 
dividend payment. Neither have they deoreased the amount of 
this payment. Therefore, the eqUity f1nancing has had ele­
ments of fixed payments just as if it were debt financing. 
These payments have been h1gher per dollar of capital raised. 
If dividend payments had not been met it would be just as 
hard to raise equity capital as 1f interest payments could 
not be met and therefore lose the opportunities to raise 
capital through debt financing. Therefore, the argument of 
the risk involved appears to be invalid. 
The fact that the cost of debt has been rising rela­
tive to the cost of eqUity is a valid argument. A tendency 
to raise more capital in recent years through debt financing 
would seem appropriate. However, in recent years, the reverse 
has been true. More capital is being raised through debt 
financing. This 1s a good argument but the Bell System hasn't 
followed the logical approach. 
The third argument appears not to be valid. By keeping 
the debt ratio between 30 and 40 per cent the Bell System 
hoped to keep the avenue of debt finanoing open to meet cus­
tomer demand. This was assuming that poor earnings would 
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result in an inability to raise dollars through equity 
finanoing. Using the proposed method presented earlier, this 
argument will be examined. 
The equity financing was fixed at the 1945 level. The 
remaining 49.4 billion dollars was raised through depreciated, 
retained earnings, and debt. Finanoing through thi s method 
raised the debt ratio to about 58 per cent. 
The ea.rnings per share were muoh higher than under the 
actual method used. The rate of return was somewhat lower. 
The return on equity capital is about 12 per cent in 1967 ver­
sus about 10 per cent as actually reported. These facts 
certainly would not appear to discourage obtaining additional 
capital through equity sources. AT&T stook would be at least 
equally attractive under the proposed method. The fact that 
the debt ratio would have risen to 58 per cent may have made 
it difficult to get more debt finanoing. However, the equity 
avenue is wide open. 
I. sUMMARY 
In this ohapter a proposed method of finanoing was 
Theexamined. Equity capital was fixed at its 1945 level. 
additional financing required was made up through retained 
earnings and debt. 
The reasons why this method was not used were then 
examined. They inclUded the risks assooiated with a large 
---------_•.....-. 
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fixed interest charge annually, the rising cost of debt 
relative to equity, and the desire to keep the debt avenue 
open by keeping the debt ratio between 30 or 40 per cent. 
These reasons were then examined for validity. The 
only reason that appeared to be valid was the rising cost of 
debt relative to equity. The fact that AT&T stock has acted 
like a bond invalidated the argument of fixed annual debt 
payments. Examination of the proposed method of financing 
shows that earnings per share and return on eqUity were much 
better than the actual methods used. 
In answer to the question asked at the beginning of 
this chapter, it appears that the methods of financing were 
not the best. By using more debt financing the demands of 
customers could have been met, the rate of return decreased 
slightly but the equity statistics look much improved. 
CHAPTER VI 
BELL SYSTEM FINANCING--FUTUBE CONSIDERATIONS 
Thus far this thesis has examined the purchase of 
telephone services since 1945 and the finanoing that was 
required to meet these purchases. Next, an analysis was made 
of the financing by examining the various souroes that were 
used. This chapter will rely on some of the information pre­
viously developed to outline what the future course of the 
Bell System should be in financing to meet the needs of 
oommunication oustomers. This ohapter will also discuss 
factors external to the Bell System which will have an affect 
on their finanoing. ~ese factors inolude gover~ent regula­
tion, general eoonomio enVironment, and the availability of 
money. 
AlthOUgh the period from 1945 to 1967 was a period of 
exceptIonal growth, there appears to be no reason t'1hy this 
growth will not oontinue for the Bell System. The only thing 
that will change Is the reason for thIs growth. Future gains 
in residence main telephones, as well as in other household 
oriented goods. will depend more on the current population 
entering household-forming years than on changes in population 
totals .. 
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Tota.l U. S. households ou tl 
rren Y number some 62 million. 
up from 38 milllon at the end of World lola.r II 1 Th 1 
• 'e evel of 
net household formation is now at an annual rate above 1 
mllllon, hlgher than ever experienoed except in the early 
postwar period when there was a oatohing-up of postponed 
marriages and an undoubling of family unlts. The annual rate 
of increase Is expected to rise to over 10) million 1n the 
next ten years and to remain in that range. 2 
Since nearly 90 per cent of U. S. households currently 
have telephone service, compared with 46 per oent in 1945, 
future demand for residenoe main telephones will oome 
inoreasingly from growth in the number of households rather 
than from increases in the proportion of eXisting households 
with telephone services. 
There wlll. of course, be some further increases in 
market penetration. and tlsecond fl homes and II1ultiple lines will 
continue to prOVide an expanding market. However, 75 per cent 
of the gain in residence telephones during the seventies should 
reflect new household formation.:3 This contrasts with the 
recent past when less than half of the gains came from this 
source. 
l".EqUltable Telephone Rates, It Telephone Engineer and 
r~nagement, LXXIII (october 15, 1969), 52. 
2 Ib1ci • 
).6 .. 4 Billion Construotion Program for '70, If Telephone 
!pgineer and Management, LXXIII (September 1, 1969), 54. 
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Once again, to meet these k1nds of d
emanda will require 
large volumes of construotion expenditures. As an example, 
the Bell System's 1970 construotion program is eat1aated to 
be $5.1 billion.! These funds will be used for growth 
expenditures, improvement expenditurea, and standing still 
expenditures. 
In the future, growth expenditures are projected to 
account for over 50 per cent of total construction expendi­
2 
tures. These expenditures w111 enable the Bell System to 
(1) meet its obligation to take care of all new demand in line 
With current services objectives: (2) handle the volume of 
long distance services for both old and new customers; () 
provide for radio and coaxial cable systems plus the expan­
sion of many eXisting toll routes; and (4) provide for the 
addition of long distance message circuits. 
Improvement expenditures will amount to about 15 per 
cent of total construction expenditures.) Included in this 
category are spendings to provide new types of services and 
improvements in existing eqUipment and services. Current 
servioe improvement projects include the Direct Distance 
Dialing program, the Uniform Numbering Plan, transmission 
improvement, Extended Area Services. toll free calling, and 
l Ib1d •
 
J1b1d• 
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the modernization of central offices by the introduction of 
electronic sWitching. 
Standing still expenditures will aocount for about 30 
per cent of the construction expenditures. 1 These expendi­
tures are required primarily to maintain the current level of 
business, with over two-thirds of the dollars spent to care 
for the ever-inoreasing movement of eXisting customers which 
results in no telephone gain. 
From this discussion it appears that demand will con­
tinue to increase and that construction expenditures needed to 
meet this demand will be in excess of $5 billion annually for 
Bome time to come. The best method of financing these con­
struction expenditures will now be discussed. 
It the same trend were to continue that has been 
established recently, about 60 per cent of this money can be 
obtained from depreciation and retained earnings. 2 This 
means that 40 per cent would have to come from external 
finanoing.) 
Presently the Bell System 1s following a policy of all 
debt finanoing. Continuation of this policy will bring the 
l Ib1d .. 
.G Bell System Statistical Manual. April. 1969. p. 418. 
)Ibld .. 
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debt ratio to about 40 per cent in 1970. 1 When this point is 
reached Bell System officials are saying that they will decide 
whether to continue this policy or to change to some eombina.. 
tion of debt and eqUity financing. 
There are several reasons why the policy of all debt 
financing should be continued. As was pointed out in the 
previous chapter, with a higher debt ratio. earnings and other 
related figures showed a substantial improvement over the 
actual method of financing that was used. Currently, the 
embedded cost of debt is about 4 per cent and the cost of 
2
equity is about 6 per cent. Therefore, it would seem appro­
priate to use the cheapest cost of financing. CUrrent cost of 
debt gives a somewhat different picture. Some of the Bell 
System companies are paying 8 to 8.5 per cent on new bond 
issues. 3 This 1s probably the first time that the cost of 
debt financ1ng has exoeeded the cost of equity financing by 
that great a margin. However, when the tax break afforded on 
interest 1s considered the cost of current debt financi.ng is 
still cheaper than current equity financing. 
The biggest concern that the Bell System has had is the 
fear that they will not be able to obtain enough money to 
meet the demand.s of customers if they over used the debt 
1Ibid. 
)TeleoommunicElt 10118 Report!!, september, 1969, p. 2. 
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avenue of financing. This fear seems to be unfounded. If 
more debt financing had been used in the past 1 
, ess external 
financing would have been required If it get t th
• s 0 e point 
where little money is available through debt financing then 
the more expensive method of eqUity finanoing is still avail­
able. 
If the Bell System would use a method of estimation to 
project revenues, expenses, total income, construction 
expenditures, and various mixes of debt and eqUity financing 
the result would be better than what has been used in the 
past. In the past certain projections have been made, but 
these projections were aimed at keeping the debt ratio at some 
fixed low figure. Had the projections been made with the 
objective of seeking the cheapest method of financing and then 
modifying to meet the availability of current money supply, 
the end result would have been a more economical method of 
financing. 
To fully accomplish the above mentioned of determining 
the best method of financing, some help is going to be needed 
from government regulation. In the past, the government 
regulators	 have Bet a fairly firm rate of return that the 
rate of return remainede	 d 
the same no matter how efficient the Bell System operated, 
What the eurrent money market was like, or what the climate 
of the general eoonomy was. It 1s imperative that this 
philosophy ohange. 
B 11 System could not exoee. Thi s 
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In determining equltable rates, commissions must give 
consideration to the current cost of capital, the prime 
interest rate, the embedded cost of debt, the earnings on 
equity capital, the debt ratio, and an equitable allowance 
for toll revenue. Though interest is not considered an 
operating expense, it is, however, becoming more and more of 
a factor that Commissions must consider in establishing 
telephone rates or rates for any regulated industry. 
The prl$e interest rate today is over 8 per cent, and 
many utilities, in selling their bonds and debentures, pay an 
interest rate in excess of the prime interest rate. When a 
regulated industry is required to negotiate loans for several 
millions of dollars, the financial agency making the loan will 
analyze the financial structure of the company and if they 
find that the oompany is earning, on their net investment, an 
amount less than the current cost of cap1tal. they will in 
all probability refuse the loan or charge them an excessive 
rate of interest. 
The embedded cost of debt is a factor which, for the 
most part, serves to determine the financial status of the 
company rather than to be considered in determining what rate 
lhe record in the currentof return a oompany should receive. 
the embedded cost of debtproceeding before the FCC shows thet 
of AT&T 1s approximately 4 per cent. This faot contributes 
much to the financial stability of the industry, but oannot be 
88 
considered as a determining factor in establi8·hlng a 
current 
rate of return on the net investment. A company shoUld not 
be penalized or have their current rate o·f retu 1 
rn owered 
because they have exercised prudent judgment in negotiating 
loans over a period of many years. If such a policy were 
followed, it would cause the financial stability of the 
industry to deteriorate. 
A rational approach to protection of the public 
interest seems to reqUire an effort to find a 
means of using private interests to motivate 
actions that will serve the public. The chal­
lenge confronting regulators is not to frustrate 
the self-seeking of private interests but to 
devise techniques of guiding such powerful forcys 
to the achievement of socially desirable goa180 
If this policy as outlined by Commissioner Loevinger were 
truly followed then there would not be a problem as it exists 
today. The various government regulators would use their 
imagination to make this statement true. 
In BUIl1l1lary the Bell System is still going to require 
large volumes of capital expenditures to meet the needs of 
oommunication oustomers. This money should oome more from 
debt finanoing than it has in the past. This is going to 
requ ire a real change in the financing philosophy of the Bell 
Systemo However, they will not be able to accomplish this 
change in philosophy without some help from government 
l"The Role of Regulation in Todays Cha.llenging Environ­
ment," Public Utilities Fortnlp;!1tl.l., XXCV (October, 1969) 29. 
~._-------.. 
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regulators. As long as the regulatory bodies insist that the 
rate of return for the Bell System be at a fixed rate it will 
be difficult for financing to be done through eqUity SOurces. 
AT&T stock has not been an attractive buy for investors in 
the past few years. The primary reason for this is that the 
earnings level as set by the FCC is much lower than what can 
be earned in other industries. Therefore, investors are 
looking at these other industries for investment. If the 
equity financing avenue was more attractive than it 1s today, 
then the Bell System would not be so hesitant about using 
more debt financing. The reason for this, of course, is if 
they ran out of sources for debt financing they could always 
fall back on equity financing. 
If these changes in philosophy can be accomplished 
then there is little doubt that the Bell System can continue 
to meet the demands of customers and continue to provide the 
best telephone service known to the world today. 
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